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4. (Confidential - GLC) Accompanied Bruce Clarke to an unclassified briefing of Ed Braswell, Senate Armed Services Committee staff, on the nature of the Soviet threat. The briefing was primarily directed to the historical background of the Soviet weapons program. Mr. Clarke also reviewed material which had been prepared by Bill Baroody, of DOD, and expressed his agreement with the figures contained in Baroody's paper. Braswell said this briefing would be most helpful to him in assisting Senator Stennis in his work on the ABM issue.

I asked Braswell if he had any reservations about our going ahead with the submission of our retirement package as indicated in the outline which we had provided him earlier. Braswell said he had no real problems on this but suggested that instead of a flat repealer of the ceiling on our number of retirements that we suggest a new ceiling figure. With regard to the section on the reemployment of retired annuitants, Braswell expressed some reservations about our following the Foreign Service provisions, but did not state a flat objection.

5. (Confidential - JMM) Ambassador Torbert, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, called about a letter the Department had received from Senator Jacob Javits inquiring of the possibility of freeing a prisoner held by the Cubans since participating in the Bay of Pigs invasion. After checking with [REDACTED] WH Division, I called Torbert to say our area experts had been in touch with their opposite numbers in State and I thought it best for the matter to be handled through that channel, to which Torbert agreed.

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6. (Confidential - JMM) Dorothy Fosdick, Staff Director, Senate Governments Operations Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, called to request, as early as possible tomorrow, an all-source briefing on the costs of major Soviet strategic weapons programs. I told her I would check and confirm.

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Mr. [REDACTED] later called Miss Fosdick and advised that he and

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Mr. [REDACTED] of OSR would be there at 9:30 a.m. tomorrow morning.

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Military Posture of the Soviet Union

Soviet military policy is focused on three goals: to overcome the US advantage in strategic offensive capabilities, to improve defensive forces as a deterrent against the US, and to upgrade Soviet capabilities for waging war short of an all-out nuclear exchange. Underlying these military goals is the Kremlin's desire to enhance its ability to act with confidence and flexibility in world affairs.

In this respect, Soviet conventional military forces have been engaged in military operations twice in the last two years. First, large ground and air forces were used for the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and several divisions have remained in Czechoslovakia. Secondly, Soviet troops clashed with Chinese troops along the Sino-Soviet border last year, reaffirming to the Soviet leadership the necessity of continuing to reinforce Soviet military capabilities along the border.

Strategic Offense

The Soviet inventory of operational land-based intercontinental missiles surpassed that of the US last year. The Soviets added some 150 missiles last year. They now have more than 1100 ICBMs in place, of which at least 230 are the large SS-9.

The latest Soviet ICBM systems have been deployed in the fashion of US Minuteman missiles--in hardened and widely dispersed single silos, each presenting a separate aiming point for an attacking force.

In addition to these measures to reduce the vulnerability of their ICBMs, the Soviets are engaged in active research and development to make qualitative improvements. Such a program is currently under way to develop a multiple warhead system for the SS-9. This system has three separate warheads, each of which might have a yield of several megatons.

For the past several years the Soviets have been experimenting with a fractional-orbit bombardment system, or FOBS. It is, in effect, an extended-range ICBM which flies on a lower trajectory than a normal ICBM and thus would be more difficult for US radars to detect and track. It might also be fired southward from the USSR, approaching the US from the south, thereby avoiding US northward-facing early warning radars.

The potential advantages of the FOBS' low trajectory are offset at least in part by the system's smaller payload and lower accuracy compared to an ICBM. It does not appear suitable as a weapon for attacking US missile sites or other hardened installations. The Soviets may view it as being effective in a surprise attack on soft targets or as a counter ABM weapon. The FOBS may already be operational and deployed in limited numbers.

In contrast to the ICBM developments, the Soviet force of about 700 medium-range and intermediate-range missile launchers has remained nearly unchanged since 1963. Most of the launch sites are in the western USSR, within striking distance of any targets in Western Europe.

The lack of change in the MRBM/IRBM force may be due to the development of a mobile strategic missile. The Soviets have claimed to have such missiles and have publicly displayed transporter-launchers for them in Moscow parades for the past several years. They have also paraded a two-stage solid-propellant missile which could be used in a mobile mode.

As their strategic missile forces have grown, the Soviets have allowed their inventory of long-range bombers to decline slightly. They now have some 150 heavy bombers, supplemented by about 50 tankers for aerial refueling. Their medium bomber force, composed of twin-jet aircraft, has declined to somewhat less than 750. Soviet medium bombers are believed to be targeted against the NATO countries and other areas on the periphery of the Soviet Union.

In an effort to extend their operational usefulness, many of the bombers, both heavies and mediums, have been modified to carry air-to-surface missiles. In addition, some of the older medium bombers have been replaced by a newer model with a supersonic dash capability.

No replacement has appeared for the four-jet Bison and four-turboprop Bear heavy bombers. A delta-wing heavy bomber which was first seen in 1961 never progressed beyond the prototype stage. The Soviets are believed to be developing a new strategic bomber, but its range is not yet known.

### Strategic Defense

Defense against strategic attack continues to hold its traditionally high priority in Soviet military planning. New antiaircraft systems are being introduced, and an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system is being installed for the defense of Moscow.

The Moscow ABM system has been in development for more than ten years. Construction of launch sites and attendant radars began about seven years ago and has proceeded irregularly since then. There have been signs that the Soviets are not going to deploy as many ABM launchers as they originally intended. The missile for the Moscow ABM system, the Galosh, was first seen in November 1964 when it was paraded, enclosed in its canister, through

Red Square in Moscow. The reduced system around Moscow, which consists of some 60 launchers, is nearly complete. It apparently now has a limited operational capability, but the slow pace of development and the fact that it has not been deployed at other cities probably indicate that Soviet officials have reservations about its effectiveness. The Soviets have an active program to improve the present system and to develop follow-on ABM components.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are still highly concerned about the threat from manned bombers and air-launched missiles. During the last few years they have upgraded their fighter-interceptor defenses by introducing new aircraft with better performance and armament. Their capabilities against advanced attack systems will be further enhanced in the near future when the Mach-3 Foxbat interceptor enters service. Their current inventory probably numbers about 3500 interceptors.

In 1963 the Soviets began deploying a new defensive missile system, sometimes referred to as the Tallinn system, in many areas of the Soviet Union for defense against aircraft and air-to-surface missiles.

The Tallinn deployment is superimposed on a large network of sites for the older and shorter-range SA-2 air defense missile system. The SA-2 parallels the US Nike-Ajax in design and performance. In addition, the Soviets are deploying mobile surface-to-air missile systems to provide improved tactical defense against attacking aircraft.

#### Tactical Aircraft

The Soviets manifest a continuing interest in upgrading their tactical air capabilities for support of ground forces. In the past three years they have displayed a number of new fighters, including two swing-wing designs and several short or vertical take-off and landing aircraft. The emphasis appears to be on fighters which can operate

away from improved airfields, lessening the aircrafts' vulnerability to attack. Most of the aircraft displayed are probably experimental, but at least one of the swing-wing fighters appears to be destined for service with tactical units.

The number of aircraft in Soviet tactical units has increased slightly in recent years and now totals about 3700.

### Navy

Since 1963, when Admiral Gorshkov assumed command of the Soviet Navy, that force has developed from a water-borne adjunct of the ground forces into a significant maritime power, operating with increasing frequency in distant waters.

The Soviet Navy began continuous deployments in the Mediterranean some five years ago. Since the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, a flotilla of nuclear submarines and missile-armed surface ships has been operating there. The flotilla has reached as many as 60 naval vessels, including submarines and support ships. Soviet warships have also been active in the Indian Ocean.

All of the major surface ships built since 1960 have been armed with surface-to-air or surface-to-surface missiles. Over 20 major surface ships and about 40 submarines are equipped with long-range anti-ship cruise missiles. The Soviets have also deployed about 100 Osa- and Komar-class patrol boats armed with a short-range missile similar to the one which the Egyptians used to sink the Israeli destroyer Elat.

The current inventory of surface ships consists of some 24 cruisers, 35 guided-missile destroyers, 50 gun-armed destroyers, 108 destroyer escorts, and some 2500 ships, minesweepers, coastal escorts, support craft, and intelligence collectors.

The Soviets are also building several new classes of ships intended to help them catch up with US naval capabilities. For example, the second of two large helicopter carriers which will be used for anti-submarine operations is about to enter service.

While the submarine fleet has declined slightly in numbers in recent years--to some 380 in 1969--its effectiveness is being improved by the addition of new types of torpedo-attack and ballistic-missile submarines.

The new Soviet Polaris-type submarine can fire 16 ballistic missiles to a range of about 1300 miles. Some eight to ten units of this class are already operational, and production has reached six to eight each year.

About 40 older ballistic-missile submarines carry an average of three launchers each. They are believed to be targeted against European and Asian targets. Only nine of these are nuclear powered.

In addition to its ballistic missile and attack submarines, the Soviet Navy has about 40 submarines equipped with cruise missiles having a range of about 250 miles. These submarines are believed to be intended to attack naval and merchant vessels. Some 300 other submarines are configured for torpedo-attack missions or used for training.

The Soviet Navy also has a land-based air force and a small force of marines. The Naval Air Force has increased slightly in the last few years and currently has about 500 bombers and 370 other aircraft for reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and transport. The aircraft are all land-based, primarily on the European coastline of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Navy has no aircraft carriers.

Increased Soviet interest in amphibious landing operations became obvious in 1967 with the introduction of tank landing ships, some of which have been deployed to the Mediterranean since July 1967. The small force of Soviet marines, however, is believed to number only about 6000 men.

#### Ground Forces

The Soviet Army is estimated to number about one and a half million men, organized into about 150 divisions. Most of these divisions are far below

full combat strength, but many of them could be brought up to strength rapidly. Even at full strength, a Soviet division is about half the size of a US division. About half of them are stationed in the Western USSR and Eastern Europe opposite NATO.

The evolution of Soviet ground forces over the past several years has been characterized by emphasis on mobility and short-term striking power at the expense of many of the support elements needed for extended combat. There are indications of a debate in Soviet military circles over the desirability of matching NATO's non-nuclear warfare capability, but so far the Soviet ground forces have shown few signs of preparation for this type of strategy.

Soviet capability for airlifting troops and equipment has been enhanced by the introduction of the new AN-22 heavy assault transport, which the Soviets unveiled at the 1967 Paris air show. The Soviets claim that this aircraft can carry 88 tons of cargo to a distance of 2800 nautical miles non-stop. The current Soviet air transport force has about 1500 short and medium range aircraft. In addition a large part of the Soviet inventory of some 1500 helicopters supports the ground forces.

#### Forces on the Sino-Soviet Border

The Soviets have substantially increased their forces along the Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia over the past few years. The augmentations involve ground, air, and missile units. Some 30 divisions with nearly 300,000 men are now located there. Before 1965, these forces were estimated to be about half that size. Moreover, the operational readiness of forces facing China has been improved. There is no evidence that the ground forces buildup has involved the transfer to the border of any units facing NATO.